

# THE LOCUS OF NATIONAL RENEWAL: GRASSROOTS OR ELITE, THE INCUMBENTS OR THE SYSTEM?

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## The Carroll Paper

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It is argued that greater equality in the distribution of the costs and rewards of development is demanded by the value system of the Filipino and by the development process itself. Important steps toward equality would be agrarian reform, educational reform, and tax reform. For these to be carried out there is need for organized pressure "from below." There is need also for strong and efficient government; whether it will in the long run be democratic depends on the attention given to genuine education and human development at the broad base of society.

It is easy, perhaps too easy, to accept an invitation to lecture when the date is some months away and the program chairman is the charming and determined Aurora Silayan Go. Thus I accepted the invitation to give this lecture. But as the appointed time grew closer and I looked more carefully at the subject assigned me, the suspicion gradually emerged that "some enemy hath done this." More and more the lecture title appeared as an invitation to get myself deported. And even after I had set aside that possibility, I still found myself wrestling for some hours with the question, "How am I as a foreigner and guest in this country to define national renewal; and if I cannot define it, how can I talk about it?"

Eventually it became clear, however, that the problem was not due entirely to the fact that I was a guest and a foreigner, although it is certainly accentuated and made more visible by it. A Filipino social scientist undertaking to give this lecture would be similarly faced with the problem of defining national renewal. He would be more free than I am to give a personal definition embodying his own hopes, dreams, ideals and aspirations. But in that case the significance of his analysis would be strongly conditioned by the extent to which *his* hopes, his dreams and ideals were relevant to the actual situation and

shared by a substantial number of his fellow Filipinos. Here I shall try to base *my* analysis on the needs and aspirations of the Filipino people as I understand them, and the relevance of my remarks will be conditioned by the accuracy of this understanding.

In this matter I take some guidance and inspiration from the work of Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish social scientist. Myrdal, as you remember, was invited many years ago to do a study of the situation of the Negro in the United States. As a framework for selecting and analyzing his material, he chose a set of value premises which he entitled "The American Creed"; they were drawn from the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States and other public expressions of the nation's ideals. His book, *An American dilemma* (1944), documented the contradiction between these ideals and the realities of race relations in the United States. For purposes of scientific analysis it was not really important whether or not Myrdal personally shared the ideals embodied in the American Creed. The important thing was that the value premises which he chose for his work were actually relevant to the American scene because they were accepted in principle by the nation. The United States Supreme Court in fact found his work so re-

levant that it quoted copiously from it in its decision outlawing segregation in the American public school system; to my knowledge Gunnar Myrdal, the Swede, is the only social scientist who has been so honored by the American Court.

### *National Renewal*

National renewal, like a nation itself, is a many-splendored thing. With the limited time and other resources at my disposal I cannot hope to cover all of its aspects. Some of them have already been discussed in earlier lectures of this series. I shall confine myself therefore to discussing only two aspects of national renewal, two of which I believe most Filipinos would consider to be fundamental and essential. In a lecture delivered from this platform in November 1969 I mentioned them: "Nevertheless, the immediate task before the nation is clear, specified not by me but by the logic of events: to achieve accelerated economic development and at the same time a more equitable sharing in both the costs and rewards of development than has been achieved to date." Now there is a well-known human tendency for a person, once having enunciated a thesis, to fall in love with it, marry it, and be faithful to it ever after. Nevertheless I do believe that the twin goals of economic development and a more equitable sharing in the costs and rewards of development were and are now valid and essential elements in national renewal for the Philippines. The reasons why they are essential can be stated briefly.

The aspirations of the great majority of the people for a higher standard of material welfare are evident and reflected in many surveys. Per-capita income figures demonstrate that the Philippines is a poor nation and that a reasonable level of material welfare cannot be provided by redistribution alone. Economic development and accelerated economic development are absolutely necessary if the Philippines is to meet the rising demands of its constantly increasing population. At the same time, evidence continues to accumulate indicating a distribution of income which is one of the most concentrated in this region and which appears to become

more concentrated over time (Oshima 1971: 32). In the concrete this means a widening of the gap in material welfare and life chances between the small "advanced" sector (not all of them "wealthy" by conventional standards) and the great mass of the poor. As Jose Gatchalian has pointed out (1972) in this series, our society is divided rather sharply into two tiers, or sectors, one of which enjoys the many benefits of the modern world while the other remains tied to subsistence agriculture and fishing, with very little access to the market or to the goods which the market can make available. Mr. Gatchalian illustrated this point with the interesting statistic that the total output of medicinal drugs in the Philippines reaches less than 10 percent of the total population. The recent findings that substantial numbers of the nation's children suffer from malnutrition at a level which can lead to permanent brain damage and limited capacity to understand and experience, throw a particularly grim light on this matter of life chances. One could go on to discuss disparity in educational opportunities, medical assistance, cultural opportunities, and the rest, between the wealthy and the poor; but I believe the general picture is clear.

Rising levels of criminality and social unrest attributable in part to poverty indicate that not all the poor acquiesce readily in their lot. Moreover, quotations from the most authoritative sources in the Philippines from the time of the revolution down to the present could easily be assembled to show that inequality such as we observe around us runs counter to the expressed ideals of the nation and offends the moral sensitivity of many of its people.

From a slightly different point of view but still in support of the thesis that greater equality is a relevant value in the Philippine situation today, we may refer to the lecture of Dr. Basilio de los Reyes in this present series (1972: 80)

Furthermore it is increasingly clear that national social problems will arise to cripple all efforts at increased productivity unless the issue of the great disparity in income between the haves and the have-nots is dealt with effectively.

These comments are in line with the observations of Myrdal who writes in his *The challenge of*

*world poverty* (1971: 50): "The conclusion I have reached is that *inequality and the trend toward rising inequality stand as a complex of inhibitions and obstacles to development* and that consequently there is an urgent need for reversing the trend and creating greater equality as a condition for speeding up development." Further, in an earlier session of this series, Carlos C. Torres (1972: 381) quoted Robert McNamara of the World Bank to the effect that "the World Bank itself now puts increasing emphasis on the social aspect of growth, including such criteria as the greater availability of jobs, wider distribution of income and improvement in the quality of life." For economic development requires the mobilization, upgrading, and motivation of the vast resources of human energies available in underdeveloped societies; but this mobilization will not be possible until the equality issue shall have been faced and a significant measure of social progress achieved.

Reflections of this kind lead to a development policy for the future radically different from the policies adopted by many of the developing countries and international organizations in the decade of the 60s. The latter brought about a growth in gross national product and per-capita income in many developing countries, but may have actually occasioned a deterioration in the living standards of substantial numbers of people (FAO Special Committee 1971: 1). The introduction of the high-yielding varieties of rice, for example, increased the income of the large farmers who were in a position to take advantage of them; but by increasing the supply of rice and reducing the price it may have resulted in *lower* incomes for the smaller farmers unable to capitalize on the opportunity. Likewise it is suspected that community development, cooperatives, and credit unions benefit primarily those who are better off in the rural community: the marketing cooperative may help the small landowner, but do little for the subsistence farmer, the landless farm laborer, or the tenant who has no surplus for the market. Yet the human resources of these groups also must be developed and mobilized if the nation is to move ahead.

High on the list of programs suggested for

achieving the twin objectives of development and distribution, is agrarian reform, understood as including at least the abolition of share tenancy and the provision of the necessary credit, technical assistance, and marketing services, probably also the creation of alternative job opportunities and other forms of economic security for the rural worker (*ibid.*: 2). To agrarian reform many would add a fundamental reform of education, putting much emphasis on adult education and the eradication of illiteracy, and drastically reducing the amount of educational resources now devoted for prestige purposes to secondary and higher education. It has been asserted that the monopoly of educational resources is as fundamental a basis of inequality in developing nations as the monopoly of land ownership, but the wealthy may cling even more tenaciously to their educational monopoly than to their land. The panic noted recently in some Philippine circles at the prospect of one elite college (St. Theresa's) being closed and its facilities being used for the education of the poor suggests that there may be much truth in this observation. Next might come tax reform, particularly in the direction of higher taxes on land and on absentee ownership of land, which would make it economically prohibitive to own land without making it productive, and a heavy tax on educational expenses which are not in accord with the system of national priorities. This latter would presumably help to reduce the waste of educational resources, and to do away with the concept noted by Fr. Piron (1972) of college as the custodial institution for those not yet ready or able to enter the labor force. Again, national renewal of the kind envisaged here will be impossible without a sharp reduction in the birth rate, making it possible to accumulate more surplus for investment and to reduce the pressure of unemployment which has been keeping the income of the poor close to the subsistence level.

I am sure that there are many other elements which should be included here, among them probably reassessment of international economic relations. But I am really not competent to discuss them, and I think enough has been said to indicate that the concept of national renewal

may well imply changes of the kind that would be undertaken in a socialist society "the day after the revolution." The question posed by the title of this lecture is "Who is to initiate such a program here?"

### *The Locus of National Renewal*

It is evident that a program of the type suggested cannot be carried out without the participation of government. It requires the formation and effective execution of policies which in many ways are quite contrary to existing practices, and a redirection of much national income toward the poor. If this were to be done effectively even in the area of agrarian reform alone, there would probably be little left over for congressional allowances, Forbes-Park-type homes, or even the Constitutional Convention. Government must be strong and effective, capable of designing and carrying out a program which imposes new and unaccustomed demands and burdens on various sectors of the population, including most of the sectors represented here tonight. This is Myrdal's point when he says that the "soft state" must give way to national discipline if development is to be achieved.

Together with others, I doubt that a government willing and able to carry out a program of this kind will ever emerge from the elite groups in a developing world; or if it does emerge from them it will do so as a result of organized pressure from the grassroots. For this type of program will impose too many demands upon the elite, require too many sacrifices, for them to conceive it and carry it through on their own.

To cite only one example, it is claimed that in most places in Latin America where effective land reform has been achieved, "it has taken place due to direct action methods applied by organized peasant groups after the legal approach had proved hopeless" (Huizer 1969: 176). In those places, land reform legislation had long been on the books but had never been effectively implemented; eventually organized peasant groups undertook to implement the law by occupying land which was subject to reform, and to avoid bloodshed and an escalation of

violence governments then hastened to implement the law.

What has been said here of land reform could be applied also to the other reforms mentioned here. Government is aware of the problems, and in many cases the conscience of the elite is bothered by them, but as Vicente Paterno pointed out on this platform some weeks ago, government only becomes truly responsive to such deep-seated problems when these are forced upon its attention by events or the possibility of events like the student protests of 1970. More than one speaker in last week's session (March 16) suggested that a major weakness of the Constitutional Convention was precisely the absence of organized pressure from below, i.e., from the broad base of Philippine society.

An interesting development comparable to the pattern described above for Latin America, has recently emerged in Bicolandia, where according to a *Manila Times* report, the Development Bank of the Philippines and six major government agencies have been mobilized and a budget of ₱2.3 million recommended in order to implement agrarian reform on land in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, which has already been seized and parceled out to some 200 cultivators by the New People's Army (NPA). This budget comes to more than ₱10,000 per farmer, aside from the value of the land itself. It will be extremely interesting to compare the performance of the government in responding to the needs of these tenants backed up by the NPA, to its performance on behalf of tenants elsewhere. Basilio de los Reyes (1972) has described its efforts in what is conceived as a pilot province on land reform involving some 46,000 tenants; it would be instructive to compare the Nueva Ecija land-reform budget on a per-capita basis with the budget for Tigaon.

A somewhat similar development, particularly hopeful because achieved without the threat of armed violence, is reported in connection with the Zone One Tondo Organization in Manila. Mary Hollnsteiner has written (1970: 195):

Early in October 1971, a milestone in "people power" vis-a-vis government agencies was reached with the joint signing by ZOTO and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) of a significant document. This was an agreement giving ZOTO members, among

other things, a say in the design and administration of the proposed PHHC Tondo Condominium plan. Such breakthroughs mark the beginning of efforts at forging new structures and processes for increasing communications between the mass base and urban planners and administrators. These innovations may ultimately arrest urban apathy, decay, and disorder in favor of a renewal based on concern, growth, and sound citizen organization in the metropolis.

Perhaps I can now formulate my replies to the questions posed in the title of this paper. National renewal means primarily the development of people, and as a great majority of the people of this nation live close to the grassroots (literally *and* figuratively), renewal must take place there. A larger share in real political power for the lower class is a necessary *means* for obtaining the resources for this kind of development; it will also be a *consequence* of development; and personally I believe that the acquisition and exercise of power through organization is itself *part* of true human development. This exercise of power will constitute a significant change in the Philippine class structure, as the tendency of the little man to depend for his security on someone slightly better off or more powerful is replaced by his ability to find security among his peers in class-based organizations. In this sense, the system will be changed, and in fact is in process of change now. Yet it is here that the greatest potential for conflict lies, for power seems harder to share than wealth.

What then is to be the role of the elite? If by elite we mean the planners, the organizers, the managers, and even more the creative individuals capable of devising new structures for achieving development with equality, they have a tremendous role to play. No society can progress in the modern world without such individuals. I am not a utopian, looking to the masses for detailed planning and utter selflessness. Grassroots groups can be as self-centered and exploitative as any other groups. What seems realistically possible is a balance of power among the sectors of society, within a framework of commitment to the progress of the nation as a whole. Hence there is need for administrators who will be both responsive to the needs of particular groups and aware of the overall interests of the nation. The nation must not cut down all its forests and make a desert of its patrimony because some

farmers want more land, any more than to satisfy the greed of some loggers. An even more important task for the educated is that of communicating the skills of organization, job skills, and technical knowledge, and an awareness of national issues, to those at the grassroots. Most of the effective work now being done (and much is being done) in assisting the poor to develop themselves is in fact being done by individuals and groups of middle-class and elite backgrounds: labor organizers and farm management technicians, priests and nuns and community organizers. Let us hope that they continue to do so, but without manipulating them, imposing their own ideas or ideologies, or preventing the emergence of genuine leadership among the poor themselves. In other words, their effort must be truly educational, geared to developing the human potential that is there. I mention this need for education and human development briefly, but it is at the heart of everything I have said tonight. To my mind, the difference between true democracy and a mass society in which the people are controlled and manipulated by a small elite (whether of oligarchs, colonels, or commissars) lies precisely in this area of genuine education and human development at the broad base of society.

But renewal is needed among many of the elite as well. This became more clear than ever to me some weeks ago when I attended the stockholders' meeting of a large corporation, faced by a strike in one of its branches which had gone on for many months with immense suffering among the workers. There are more than a thousand stockholders in the corporation; they include six Roman Catholic bishops and one Protestant bishop, various religious congregations and institutions and many of the regional and national elite. Only about 20 persons were present at the meeting, however; in their own names or by the proxies which they held these 20 people represented more than 90 percent of the company's outstanding stock. Outside the meeting place, students and workers were demonstrating, peaceably, attempting to call to the attention of the stockholders the moral and social issues involved in the strike. One student who had obtained a proxy arose in the stock-

holders' meeting and attempted to bring these issues to the floor. He was ruled out of order on a technicality and his remarks stricken from the record. Later a priest attempted to raise these same issues and was given a purely legal answer. With the active participation of a Con-Con delegate among the stockholders the Board of Directors was re-elected *en bloc* and a motion of gratitude and appreciation for the work of management was passed. It was announced that substantial donations had been made to various charitable and philanthropic organizations. At the end of an hour the meeting was over, and the fate of the striking employees left entirely in the hands of the court.

I recount this as a parable. I cannot prove that it is typical, although the stockholders involved are a significant portion of the Philippine elite. But it does suggest some conclusions about the structure of power in the Philippines. Power obviously is concentrated when some 20 men can speak for the stockholders of a major corporation. It is concentrated partly because wealth is concentrated, and partly because the majority of stockholders, like the great majority of citizens in other matters, have abdicated their personal responsibilities. Moral and social issues were referred to the courts, despite the mistrust of the legal processes voiced by substantial numbers of Filipinos in answer to survey questions. Those who were willing to share wealth through donations to foundations seemed totally unwilling to share power even to the limited extent of appointing a committee to hear the workers' side. Short of calling on Chairman Mao, it seems essential that countervailing power at the base of the social structure be built up to the point at which a real hearing for the cause of the poor can be demanded.

Elsewhere we see the continuing growth of warlordism and "security agencies" ready to defend the power of the elite against the growing power of the organized poor. Violent and near-violent confrontations continue to occur; anyone now who thinks of organizing peasants in the Philippines must face the prospect of having to confront hired goons. In some areas of the country the situation is becoming polarized and threatens an eruption not of or-

ganized revolution but of mindless violence and repression. Herein lies the danger of disruption and chaos which can prevent any real national development. And I might note that the private armies formed by the elite in Latin America have been known to grow weary of killing each other, turn their guns against their employers and plunge their countries into civil war. Whether some similar pattern will develop here will depend to a very large extent on the way in which the elite react to growing pressure from the grassroots, whether they oppose it by armed force and legal maneuvers in an effort to retain their power, or accommodate to it as part of the democratic process. In this sense the most critical decisions lie with the elite.

### *Conclusion*

It is customary to end lectures such as this on a hopeful note. But Myrdal, whom I have quoted so often, notes that optimism too is a bias. He suggests that in South and Southeast Asia as a whole the odds may favor neither revolution nor renewal but only stagnation and increased misery. He does note however that the long democratic tradition in the Philippines may increase the probability of a genuine renewal; the fact that men profess certain ideals may tip the scales in favor of practice when the chips are down. Perhaps my own tempered optimism is based more on the Christian faith than on any sociological reading of the palm of the future. The Christian always looks forward to Easter Sunday but never forgets that a Good Friday of pain and confusion came first.

### *Note*

This is the revised version of a paper read March 23, 1972, in the public lecture series, "Social Issues '72," at the San Miguel Auditorium, Makati, Rizal, under the sponsorship of the Philippine Sociological Society, Inc. Fr. Carroll received the Ph.D. in sociology from Cornell University in 1962. At this writing he was Research Director of the National Secretariate for Social Action (NASSA).

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### Abstract of the Paper of Zeus A. Salazar on the Locus of National Renewal

The numerous opinions expressed about problems faced by the Philippine state and society may be said to stem from one or more of three outlooks, three frames of reference, namely: the individual-mystical; the scientific, or fragmented; and the holistic.

#### *Analyses*

The first point of view sees Philippine problems rooted in the nature of man in general, and of the Filipino in particular. Man is naturally selfish, evil, undisciplined; the Filipino is similarly tainted, both by nature and by the historical heritage of a vanquished race. Basically this point of view is psychological, and takes no account of structural, systemic features of the environment.

The second point of view, the *scientific*, draws on four kinds of findings: the economic, the political-scientific, the socioanthropological, and the historicist-humanist. To the economic mind, the Philippines' problems may be traced either to a state of stagnation induced by the malignant action of certain external forces, or alternatively to a transitional phase on the route to progress with the help of those same external forces. The political-scientific explanation sees socioindividual and institutional factors at fault. The problem is, in essence, that of articulating in the most efficient but democratic manner the needs and aspirations of the national community, of correcting a maladjustment in the interplay between political man and his institutions. The socioanthropological approach looks especially to modernization and acculturation as explanations of the nation's current condition. Modernization, an adaptive process, has become the source of disequilibrium in the society. Further, in reacting to western culture as brought to it by Spain and America, the Philippines, at first acceptant, has now become more critical, less pliant. Problems inherent in the search for national identity and national integration (of minority groups) are now afflicting the nation. From the historicist-humanist position the Philippine dilemma is seen either as a stage of feverish ferment in the emergence of a unique historical entity, or as a moment in the universal drama of progress toward the much broader goal of human self-realization.

The third major viewpoint is the *holistic*. By this approach the Philippine crisis is seen as resulting from the transitional stage and victimized condition in which the society finds itself. The Filipino nation is caught in the throes of societal transformation, a painful transition from a predominantly feudal mode of production toward a more capitalist-oriented one. The holistic view sees the Philippines, moreover, as exploited by imperialist foreign nations.

### *Therapeutic Measures*

Each of the three viewpoints has its characteristic prescriptions for solving the nation's problems as it has described them. Thus those who follow the *individual-mystical* approach see the answer in a reassertion of the freedom and power of the individual, the efficacy of God's grace despite man's fallen condition, and the real possibility of achieving social harmony. Beyond this, one can call on the power of a strong state to give order and cohesion to the national body politic, or appeal to other national groups to help us.

More predisposed to change, the *scientific* diagnoses tend to prescribe more of the same "but in the appropriate dose and under stricter supervision" or more of the same "but of a somewhat different direction." Thus from the economic viewpoint, the crisis of our "agro-merchandising" economy can be solved in terms of policy-making and policy-implementation, through the application of technocratic know-how. The solution may be either "realist" or "nationalist," but a solution is in any event seen as manageable. The *political-scientific* answer lies in a modifying of the organs, mechanisms, or even the framework of the state, without however replacing the present form of government. The *socioanthropological* approach has only fragmentary solutions to offer — an easing of the tensions induced by the inevitable processes of modernization and acculturation, wherever these difficulties may appear. From the *historicist-humanist* viewpoint, the answer is in the Philippine nation's acquiring more consistency, perhaps by explicit recognition of its own pluralistic origins as Asians "greatly influenced by the West."

The *holistic* diagnosis here results in the prescription of revolution as the only truly consistent solution to Philippine problems. This revolution, the viewpoint continues, will be anti-imperialist and anti-feudal.

### *Loci or Agencies of Renewal*

Where the national renewal will start depends in turn on the solution that has been proposed. For the individual-mystical position, the locus will be the individual (conversion or reform) or civic, professional, religious, and governmental organizations. The scientific diagnoses and prescriptions, being fragmentary, tend to expect loci in and around the elite, with differences related to the particular discipline proposing the solution. The elite may be further identified as the incumbent policy-makers or policy-implementers, incumbent office holders, religious and civic groups (assisting in electoral reforms), state and business agencies, missionaries, educators (agents of change). The holistic analysis sees the locus, the focal point of all renewal, in class struggle. In this struggle the main role is assigned to an alliance between the working class and the peasantry, in cooperation with others but not subordinated to them.

To summarize, the question of the locus of Filipino national renewal can be answered only in relation to specific analyses from particular vantage points. These vantage points were examined in relation to the diagnoses and prescriptions which they imply. Then the locus or loci appropriate to each solution were stated.

### *Note*

This is the abstract (written by the Editor) of a paper read March 23, 1972, in the public lecture series, "Social Issues '72," at the San Miguel Auditorium, Makati, Rizal, under the sponsorship of the Philippine Sociological Society, Inc. Dr. Salazar received the Doctorat en ethnologie from the University of Paris in 1968 and is currently an associate professor, department of history, University of the Philippines.



## Comment on the Carroll and Salazar Papers

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Presented with and asked to comment on two opposed viewpoints, one is tempted to harmonize them, to pick out pieces of each that will fit well together. Thus one might say that Dr. Carroll's twin national goals of development and equality are indeed the goals sought in Dr. Salazar's analysis, or that Salazar's holistic alliance is the kind of cooperation between mobilized masses and a modernizing elite that Carroll seeks, or perhaps that Salazar's revolution is in fact Carroll's "Good Friday of pain and confusion," that will post factum be made into a myth of national renewal through struggle equivalent to Valley Forge or the Long March.

But I believe eclectic harmonizing is essentially in error, for there is a fundamental difference between the two viewpoints, one lying beneath the question of evolution versus revolution, and the related question of whether Carroll's hesitant and ambivalent approach to elite-mass relations is not a tacit approval of revolution, as long as it is organized and not "mindless violence." The fundamental difference I see has to do with a national goal that I believe is tacit in Salazar's analysis, though buried under the theoretical suprastructure, but that does not anywhere inform Carroll's, namely, the goal of seeking a positive, effective, respected, but realistic national identity.

I speak of "national identity" rather than using the more common term "nationalism" for two reasons: (1) the term "nationalism" carries the emotional burden of struggles for political independence and of cold-war rhetoric that is no longer entirely appropriate with the receding of the western European empires, the lowering of the bamboo curtain, and the coming of age of post-colonial generations; (2) the term "national identity" suggests the affinity of this quest with the aspirations of collectivities other than the nation-state, such as the aspirations of the Bengali within what used to be Pakistan, or the aborigines of the Australian outback, or even the Muslims of the South.

The quest for a national identity is a stronger force than the desire for economic development or for social equality. In a broad sense it cannot be separated from these other goals, but if it could a people would be more likely to opt for a hell of their own making than for a foreign-dominated paradise. Writing 12 years ago when the term "nationalism" may have been more appropriate, Rupert Emerson said (1960: 3-4):

The prime rival to nationalism as a driving force is presumed to be the desire for an improved standard of living. From time to time, it is asserted that the ordinary poverty-stricken Asian and African is really interested only in seeing an end put to his poverty. This is a highly dubious proposition. The evidence indicates that he regards at least temporary economic privation as an appropriate price to pay for national salvation . . . . However strong the urge toward better living conditions and economic development, it tends always to take second place to the political claims of nationalism.

Why is a new national identity necessary? What is wrong with our old identity as a liberal political democracy, or, in some fanciful conceptions, as an outpost of Christianity in Asia? These identities ignore too many of the realities of internal obstacles to development and of international power relations. Internationally they provide no basis for seeking equality in the chorus of nations, for becoming a causal force and not a pawn in world affairs. Internally they do not accurately represent the political situation, on which I need not elaborate, and while a gap between national self-image and reality may be tolerable for a time, the strains of development and the revolution of rising expectations make it unlikely that such a gap can be maintained for long without national self-redefinition.

A national identity is a kind of political religion which, like a church religion, satisfies deep personal needs for immortality, individual identity, and personal meanings and purposes (Apter 1963). It must blend three kinds of elements, the traditional, the modern, and the utopian. Its traditional element is essentially a creative reworking of the nation's history to discover or invent its distinctive elements, and

a celebration of particular "traditional" values. The traditional element provides the rootedness and the sense of community with previous generations essential for a stable identity. The modern element in a national identity has to do with a national commitment to such values as rationality, equality, economic power, and justice. The modern component may begin as a promise to seek these goals, but must eventually include particular programs and actually lead to specific changes within the society. The modern component is essential to satisfy the proliferating aspirations of the people, and to avoid invidious comparisons with other nations. The utopian element, finally, may include ideas of the ultimate achievement of human brotherhood or of universal hominization or some such remote paradise. Herein falls the internationalist aspect of Salazar's analysis.

In relation to development, such a national identity or political religion has a crucial role to play in providing a level for social change, in exacting sacrifices from those who must contribute to development. Such an identity frees tremendous energies that would otherwise be devoted to personal pursuits, overcoming primordial ties and mobilizing people to participate actively in a national effort. Such an identity produces the optimism of the confirmed ideologue, as opposed to the pessimism of the piecemeal planner, who rejects totalistic answers as oversimplifications.

It is in this light I see the contrast between Carroll's and Salazar's arguments, the first proceeding without reference to this goal and the second with this goal primary but unstated, and building an elaborate conceptual structure upon it. Carroll falls short — one article short — of enunciating this goal when he says: "National renewal means essentially the development of people." What I am saying is that national renewal is the development of *a* people. Seeking national renewal is first of all seeking a new national identity, within the context of which the reforms necessary for development and for promoting greater equality can proceed, and which will provide the motivation for people to be patient, to commit themselves to goals that will not be achieved in their lifetimes.

The locus of such renewal will certainly not be 300-some supposedly wise men, though that may have been the hope of some people laborious months ago. As Carroll suggests, both elite and masses will play a part. The masses are always less involved in the religions of the center, much more tied to the recurrent exigencies and dilemmas of scratching out a daily living. But they are mobilizable, and their aspirations, as well as their sense of their own power, are crucial parts of a national identity for any participant and just society. As Salazar suggests, the conflict, or perhaps the creative interaction, between elite and masses, rather than these groups separately, may be the locus for change. Obviously a new identity must be fought for against the entrenched interests of those who benefit from aspects of the present social order. From considering the traditional, the modern and the utopian elements of a national identity it is clear that peasants and proletariat, as well as the modern business sector, the artists and the intellectuals, not excepting Salazar and perhaps including Carroll, will each play a part. A distinctive role may be played by adolescents and youth, who, in quest of their own personal identities, while still free from institutional ties and commitments, are driven to reexamine the social context within which they are asked to project their life plans, so that personal re-examination is accompanied by a reexamination of where the nation is, of whether it lives up to its ideals, of whether it can provide them with the guidance of a Filipino Dream or whether they must create one for themselves, and in so doing discover a new identity and new perspectives for the nation as a whole.

#### *Note*

This is the slightly revised version of a comment read March 23, 1972, in the public lecture series, "Social Issues '72," at the San Miguel Auditorium, Makati, Rizal, under the sponsorship of the Philippine Sociological Society, Inc. Dr. Bulatao, president of the Philippine Sociological Society for 1972, is an assistant professor, department of sociology, University of the Philippines. He received the doctorate in sociology from the University of Chicago in 1971.

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## Comment on the Carroll and Salazar Papers

JESSICA C. FERNANDEZ

April 4, 1972

My initial reaction to the invitation to be on this panel was like that of Fr. Carroll, but for an altogether different reason. I accepted it, prepared to "do battle," only to be dismayed when I later received Fr. Carroll's paper and found so many points of agreement. This disappointment was heightened when I received Dr. Salazar's paper, which answered almost all of the few questions I had raised about Fr. Carroll's paper. Surely, "Some enemy hath done this."

Hence, what I intend to do is to focus and/or refocus, within the context of my experience in organizing, some basic issues brought out by the two papers. Later I shall raise a few questions. The basic issues set forth by the papers are the following.

- A. That the existing inequality between the rich (the haves) and the poor (the have-nots) is an obstacle to development.
- B. That national renewal requires no less than radical changes, apparently the kind which come "the day after the revolution." But this may never happen. Or if it does, it certainly will be long in coming. It will not come as long as we continue holding seminars, discussion sessions, public lecture series, and the like. As I said recently to a group of Protestant clergy, the revolution will be here when people stop talking and start shooting.
- C. That it is highly doubtful that change will ever emerge from the elite sector of society, except as a "result of organized pressure from the grassroots," or the masses.

The underlying implication here is, bluntly put: unless the poor, whose strength lies in their numbers, grab power, they will never have it.

Fr. Carroll cites the Latin-American experience in land reform. I would like to present some results which the organized pressure of Zone One Tondo Organization (ZOTO) has produced relative to its land issue. From this issue springs ZOTO's policy of relocation within Tondo; from it as well have sprung its Land Titling and Housing programs. The results are these.

1. The invasion of the Parola Compound in April 1971, after a series of futile talks with government officials, especially those in the Department of Public Works. Called Barrio Pilipinong Walang-Wala by ZOTO people during the invasion, the Compound has since been named Bonifacio Village. Recently featured in *Impact* magazine, Bonifacio Village provides an economical housing scheme, complete with electricity and water supply (Murphy 1972a).
2. The invasion of the Del Pan Nawasa (now MWSS) Compound, where a project of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) was underway. The outcome of this action is cited by Mary Hollnsteiner (Murphy 1972b).
3. The Cardinal issue, out of which were born the Mga Kaibigan ng ZOTO, or Friends of ZOTO (most of them members of the national bourgeoisie; a few from the elite) and the Land Titling Office which is now processing ZOTO members' land-title claims.
4. And now, ZOTO has moved on from "mere battles" to what the leaders consider their war against the Office of

the Special Commissioner on Port Administration.

- D. That national renewal primarily means development of people through organization. In relation to this, I would like to point out that *what is important in organizing is not the methodology but what happens to people in the process of organizing.*

Now let me discuss some feelings I had, which may be loosely defined as points of disagreement with Fr. Carroll.

1. The anxiety he seemed to have about the elite using the poor in carrying out its role. This is a very valid point. But if you are an organizer, you have faith in the people, which means that you believe that ultimately, the people know what is best for them and will work it out by and for themselves in the long run; and so you know that the imposition will not be forever. Shortly put, that the people will prevail.
2. The general impression the paper gives me that it is more on what *ought* to be, not what *is*.

Lastly, I would like to draw your attention to the international dimension and implications of national renewal, touching on foreign "developmental aid" and investment. As pointed out by Gunnar Myrdal (1971),

The influence except by the developed countries – through direct private investments and public aid – has seldom been directed toward creating greater equality. It has more often than not tended to foster social and political reaction . . . It is a fact that the governments in developed countries, and in particular the government of the US, are exerting pressure upon the governments in underdeveloped countries in regard to their agricultural policies. Is it really necessary that this pressure should completely bypass the equality issue which is so important also for productivity?

Here, USAID's, World Bank's and other Western "developmental" agencies' support of the miracle-rice, green-revolution, and birth-control programs is a clear example of how these imperialistic agencies work, assisting our country to achieve "self-sufficiency" and remain a perpetual supplier of raw materials.

ZOTO is learning how to react to these facts.

It has in the past confronted USAID officials about their activities, from military matters to the nutri-bun. Perhaps for the first time in the history of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), a demonstration rally was held in front of its headquarters on UN Avenue. ZOTO questioned its involvement in developmental projects going on in ZOTO territory. At present, communication is underway between the German Embassy and the Organization regarding the German government's loan for port-and-harbor development.

By action-reflection through struggle, the people are slowly but steadily comprehending the "isms"; tying them up with their lives; and in the process, making history. What they will do next is their decision.

#### Note

This is the slightly revised version of a comment read March 23, 1972, in the public lecture series, "Social Issues '72," at the San Miguel Auditorium, Mckati, Rizal, under the sponsorship of the Philippine Sociological Society, Inc. At the time she made this comment Miss Fernandez was staff field coordinator of the Philippine Ecumenical Council on Community Organization at Zone One Tondo Organization (ZOTO). She is a candidate for the M.S. in social work at Centro Escolar University, but is currently abroad..

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## Comments On The Carroll And Salazar Papers

J. ELISEO ROCAMORA

April 14, 1972

I must admit to a degree of confusion when I first read the topic for this symposium. I assumed that the topic was phrased in such a manner as to allow the speakers two or more fairly clear-cut choices. But it did not seem to me that there were choices to be made, or at least not clear-cut ones. "Grassroots" and "the system" seemed reasonable enough as "loci of national renewal," although I was a bit piqued at the kind of academic *delicadeza* which dictated the use of the innocuous "grassroots" when "masses" would have been more appropriate.

After considering various interpretations, I finally decided that the diffuse character of the topic was intentional and, to agree with Prof. Salazar, even "clever." I was forced to come to this conclusion, when, after reading Fr. Carroll's and Prof. Salazar's papers, I realized that neither of them had really tried to grapple seriously with the dichotomies suggested in the topic. But the topic did allow them to discourse in their own chosen ways on the catch-all topic of "national renewal."

As an expression of his personal concern and obvious affection for this country, Fr. Carroll's paper is admirable. The goal of "... bringing about a more equitable distribution of income" is one that no one can really argue against. The more specific problems that he identifies are ones that we should all be concerned about. My disagreement with Fr. Carroll's paper does not lie in the specific points that it makes but rather in the liberalism and pluralism which infuses his whole intellectual style. I do not believe that "national renewal" or, to use a more neutral phrase, national development (because national renewal sounds too much like moral rearmament) will come about as a result of piecemeal reforms.

On the whole, I found myself agreeing more with Prof. Salazar than with Fr. Carroll. Prof. Salazar's dissection of a whole spectrum of ideas and intellectual systems was quite stimulating and often amusing. But as I listened to him

elaborate on the paper outline we were furnished beforehand, I found myself increasingly disturbed by the drip, drip, drip of sarcasm, contempt, and cynicism that came forth. I thought at first that this might be a matter of excusable personal style. Then I decided to follow Prof. Salazar's coining of new words and said to myself that his talk was rather "intellectualistic." I was increasingly concerned that his rather cavalier dismissal of whole academic disciplines and his contempt for efforts at defining what is unique to the Philippines might result in insufficient attention to the dynamic relationship between theory and practice.

Because I was disturbed by the tone of Prof. Salazar's paper (even as I agreed with its basic analytical outline), I finally decided to risk making my own definition of the problem. As I see it there are two competing strategies for the achievement of economic progress and modernity. One strategy sees national development as a process of departure from the traditional concerns of the village world into the "modern" and "rational" world of the elite. The policies of its adherents focus on monetary and fiscal stability, on the establishment of norms of legality and "rationality" in public administration and, most important, on "creating a proper climate for entrepreneurship." There is nothing wrong with stability and rationality, *per se*. The problem is that these policies are given priority over, and often at the expense of, those that would solve more basic problems in the country's economic and social structure. Because this strategy conceives of progress as movement from tradition to modernity, it accepts the division between the masses and the elite and sees it primarily in cultural and intellectual terms. It refuses to admit the existence of an element of *conflict* between the interests of the elite and those of the masses.

Set against this elitist strategy of development is one that focuses on mass mobilization — on

the integration of the masses into the process of development. It is a strategy that would establish goals based, not on Western conceptions of modernity, but on the more immediate and basic needs of the people. It sees mass poverty as resulting not from "tradition" or the absence of "modern" skills and values among the people, but from colonial and elite exploitation. It views the elite-mass cleavage as involving relationships of exploitation and oppression apart from cultural differentiation.

In contrast to what we shall call "modernization strategy," which emphasizes stability, *mobilization strategy* is premised on the need for social revolution. It assumes that economic development cannot be achieved without the destruction of social and political structures which hinder the development of the masses as a force for development. One of the first targets of this strategy is foreign dominance in the post-independence economy. Where modernization strategy sees Western investment as a positive force in the process of development, mobiliza-

tion strategy sees it as an obstacle and as a powerful prop of elite dominance.

The two strategies also differ in their conception of the role of political leadership in a developing society. For mobilization strategy, leadership is not based on managerial competence or educational qualification, but on the ability to raise the level of political consciousness of the people and to motivate and organize them for mass action. Hence the need to draw upon the peasant and working classes for leaders, not only for political parties, but also for government as well.

#### Note

This is the slightly revised version of a comment read March 23, 1972, in the public lecture series, "Social Issues '72," at the San Miguel Auditorium, Makati, Rizal, under the sponsorship of the Philippine Sociological Society, Inc. Prof. Rocamora is an assistant professor, department of political science, University of the Philippines. He is a candidate for the Ph.D. in political science, Cornell University.

#### FORTHCOMING IN PSR: a KINSHIP issue (January 1973)

**Articles** A. E. Evangelista on tuba drinking and kinship in Bulacan; J. A. N. Dizon on interaction with kinsmen among Metro Manila managers; W. F. Arce on choosing ritual kinsmen in Camarines Sur; F. J. Murray on local kin groups in Nueva Ecija

**Research notes** P. Flattery on Barlig, Bontok; F. Lynch on Filipino "clannishness" in Bulacan and Camarines Sur

**Reviews:** A. M. L. Coseteng, *Spanish churches in the Philippines* (reviewed by Dom Bernardo Perez); N. P. Cushner, *Spain in the Philippines* (reviewed by J. N. Schumacher, Hollnsteiner, G. J. Gil, and F. Lynch)

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